Animal Ethics: How we ought to coexist with non human animals, a perspective.

Animal Ethics: How We Ought to Coexist with Non Human Animals
Vivian Zottola
Anthrozoology Graduate Program
Canisius College
 
It has taken over two thousand years for human animal’s moral and ethical compass to change from Aristotle’s “great chain of being” and Descartes notion that animals are machines, to accepted discussions from animal liberationist Singer, animal rights abolitionist Regan and many more progressively compassionate ethical views. Ironically, even in the face of growing empirical evidence supporting our similarities with non human animals, many still cling to human exceptionalism as reasons to rationalize abhorrent behavior toward non human animals. While I believe it would be wonderful to coexist with non human animals in a world where they are allowed, by human animals to live their lives free of suffrage, oppression, and consumption achieving this utopian vision seems somewhat illusory.

I am legal owner of non human animals and as such, perpetuate their oppression. While this is something I now reject, it has not always been so. How do I reconcile this moral paradox where I am today that is, owning pet dogs and believing otherwise? One might question, how hypocritical it might be to make claims, non human animals ought to be free from subjugation while I keep them as companion animals captive in my home. Virtue ethics thankfully takes into consideration the context of circumstances and while criticized as vague, it allows for motive and reason for ones action (Driver, 2007, p.151). What obligated me to keep these dogs? It certainly wasn’t legal constraints since as owner, while I am not permitted to directly kill my pet dogs I am allowed to surrender them to a shelter where there is a high probability of death. Alternatively, I could have also opted to request a veterinarian perform convenience euthanasia. Both perfectly legal options and morally wrong to me. 

I agree with Norcross (2004), ”what grounds moral agency is simply different from what grounds moral standing as a patient (p.243)”. What morally obligated me to care for my pets is as Regan suggest they are “subjects of a life”. As a moral agent capable of knowing right from wrong, and being morally accountable for my actions, I believe non human animals ought to be protected from human animal selfish mistakes and unfortunate life circumstances that are out of our control. Is it fair for non human animals to suffer the anguish of being separated from their human home environment, and even killed because of human animal circumstances? These are difficult questions to answer. However establishing laws to protect non human animal rights as Regan would suggest only seems just (Hursthouse, 2013, p.84). Based on empirical evidence we have today, young children like non human animals (dogs) are incapable of knowing right and wrong. Like children, they rely on adults (moral agents) to act as custodians who will protect them from harm and suffering.  Moral obligations are comprised of feelings of concern, attachment for one’s kind, and as Midgley suggests living with and experiencing non human animals may be the driving factor to help us cross the species barrier and include them in legal obligations (Hursthouse , 2013, p.126).

​“According to thinkers who embrace some form of human exceptionalism, when a non human animal is tortured, the harm to the animal is not what matters from an ethical point of view but rather the harm that reflects on the torturer and the society to which the torturer belongs” (Driver, 2013, p.4).  While I appreciate Kant’s claim, that human animals suffer when tortured and further, that humans should refrain from wonton cruelty to animals, I question how he accepts the premise non human animals suffer yet does not acknowledge or make accountable the very thing that causes the suffering? I agree with Regan, the indirect view is not rational and we cannot ignore or dismiss the moral relevance of pain to the animal subjected (Hursthouse,2013, p181).  I also have issue with Contractarian view that duties regarding non human animals are different from those regarding human animals.  It seems Rawls view of “social justice” presupposes the human animal social network only includes the human animal species. Historically, this may have been the case however, for many human animals times have changed and their social network has extended to include non human animals. Many non human animals including are not only part of our social network but an integral part of family.

The  more I work to help human animals and their pet non human animals resolve challenging problems in order to remain living together, the more convinced I am we should not live together. Considering the utilitarian view of maximizing pleasure, owning and living with pet dogs provide human animals joy, companionship and even improves mental illness and physical health. The relationship however, is often inequitable for the dog. They lose liberty and “practical autonomy”, relying on the moral compassion of human animals to provide food, water, relief, veterinary care, grooming, social and mental stimulation. What if the human animal possesses no moral compassion as is often the case? While non human animals are capable of living a full life, many are not granted that opportunity.  Nussbaum (2004) discusses autonomy as “one who can desire, intentionally try to fulfill desires and possess self sufficiency to understand” (p.32). These points are all true. However when in the custody of a human, if a dog doesn’t meet certain subjective or behavioral expectations, the owner has the legal right to return, surrender or request euthanasia. A client I once worked with used a shock collar on her crated puppy. She reasoned the shock collar was necessary to silence the dog during the day while she was at work so not to disturb neighbors and risk being evicted. It didn’t occur to her that the dog vocalized because of fear of being alone. It was my job to ensure she understood this distinction so to change her behaviors and use alternative, more humane management strategies thereby keeping the dog in her home.

Human animals are expected to be virtuous moral agents and yet many are not. Is it fair to maximize a dog owner’s pleasure to own a dog over the right of the dog to live a life free of pain and psychological torture? Does the selfish desire of dog ownership outweigh the individual dogs’ intrinsic value? I agree with Regan’s criticism that the utilitarian view cannot respect the distinct intrinsic value of an individual life since its premise is to “ maximize pleasure and minimize pain for all those affected by any given action.” (Gruen, 2011, p. 34) This framework doesn’t recognize all subjects of a life as individuals, that there is a relationship between individuals and each individual having their own desires. Rather, it is focused on considerations of the greater good, whom, just happen to make up all of the laws.

I rather like and see practical applications for Nussbaum’s use of entitlements and the Capabilities Approach with non human animals. My only objection is allowing punitive measures under “ Bodily Integrity”. Enforcing direct human obligation of justice in the form of non animal entitlements might just result in less abusive behavior by human animals. While contractual obligations are great, unfortunately as they stand today they are based on derivatives of duty which leaves the non human animal unprotected. If we allow non human animals entitlements and obligate people to be directly accountable for their actions via severe penalties for their actions to non human animals similar to those we grant for human animals, we may experience better human animal behaviors. Reading through her list makes me feel hopeful for a brighter future for non human animals. (Nussbaum, 2004, p.313)

Hursthouse’s (2013) Virtue ethics suggests as students we apply “principal of charity” that is, “try to find the best, the most reasonable or plausible rather than worst possible interpretation of what we read and hear” (p4).  Considering this statement I have remained open to learning from philosophical thinkers and people, even when I disagree. Many for example reason it is okay to train their pet dogs using punitive methods or, they may justify consumption of non human animals because they are dumb, were created for our use, or don’t have the same rich intellectual abilities as human animals. I reject these positions. The argument for moral permissibility used by people to justify the way they act toward non human animals whether consumption or abuse, tries to draw a moral distinction based on arbitrary lines between us and them. Norcross (2004) brilliantly discredits this line of thinking using the Argument for Marginal Cases (AMC) he states, if it is morally permissible to eat non human animals on the basis that they fall under an arbitrary line, as for example intelligence, then we must also include humans that fall under this line. As for example human babies, cognitively impaired humans, and the elderly suffering from cognitive ability or dementia would all be morally permissible to consume too based on intelligence in this case. (p.241). 

The AMC could be applied to people who own non human animals (companion animals) and think it morally permissible to use punitive training methods and or equipment. Interestingly, the use of corporal punishment on children (moral patients) was outlawed in the 1960’s and yet, its use remains permissible with non human animals. By way of the AMC non human animals ought to fall under the same protection as children by way of moral patients. It does not seem morally equitable or just that non human animals (companion animals) are not protected from this blatant abuse and suffrage.

I agree with Singer, Regan and others who have argued there is no intellectual or morally good reason to support that an individuals’ biological or genetic makeup has anything to do with how we ought to treat non human animals. Many practice “speciesism” and in fact, before developing moral awareness of our similarities with non human animals, I did as well.  Like most pet owners I too would never have dreamed of eating a pet dog but a chicken sandwich or my mothers’ meatballs? Of course I would and with pleasure. Yet when challenged about the similarities between pig, cow, chicken and dog the common denominator was relational. The pet dog for many was considered a family member. Breaking that species barrier will rely on having a relationship with and empathy for non human animals. Moral psychology and ethics scholar Aaltola (2018) writes on Midgley that she has reintroduced sentimentalism back into animal ethics a notion that earlier animal ethic philosophers namely Singer had pushed back on and instead focused purely on rationalism. Midgley instead suggests emotions and reason are fused “like shape and form forever locked into each other” (pg 12).  

Philosophical thinkers are now free to include compassion, care and relationships as narratives following Gilligan’s scientific findings which helped shift underlying male biases that formed our philosophical thinking as a culture and resulting in our present legal framework. Her work exposed “moral reality as relational”, and that we are dependent on one another rather than the false notion of being “fully autonomous agents” as was established by the Contractarian view.  The rules of the game have changed and philosophical thinking is now open to new moral and ethical interpretations for non human animals (Driver, 2013, p.4).  Perhaps new thinkers who encompass empathy and relationships will help move us closer to making changes to our legal framework where we may live in a world free of non human animal suffrage and enslavement.

While my desire is to live a life free from direct and indirect suffrage of non human animals I am learning at best, it may be a life closer, to as Gruen (2015) suggests, “veganism as an aspiration” (p.157).  Non human animal consumption in one form or another touches our lives in the food we eat, clothes we wear, car we drive and vitamins we take (Gruen & Jones, 2015, p.157). I fundamentally agree with Feminist, Caring and Virtue ethicist, there are systemic problems that have resulted because relationships and caring for others was missing in our moral community. And I agree with Singer and Regan who both suggest, “how our societies function and are organized ought to change” (Hursthouse, 2013,p.84).
 
 
References
 
Aaltola, E. (2018). Varieties of Empathy: Moral Psychology and Animal Ethics.
Driver, J. (2013). Ethics: the fundamentals. John Wiley & Sons.
Gruen, L. (2011). Ethics and animals: An introduction. Cambridge University Press.
Gruen, L., & Jones, R. C. (2015). Veganism as an Aspiration. The moral complexities of eating meat, 153-171.
Hursthouse, R. (2013). Ethics, humans and other animals: An introduction with readings. Routledge.
Midgley, M. (1998). Animals and Why They Matter. University of Georgia Press.
Norcross, A. (2004). Puppies, pigs, and people: Eating meat and marginal cases. Philosophical perspectives, 18(1), 229-245.
Sunstein, C. R., & Nussbaum, M. C. (Eds.). (2004). Animal rights: Current debates and new directions. Oxford University Press.